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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 20010783-CA

BERT LIETZ,
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION1
1. Did the trial court err in striking her order dismissing the case?
The question of whether the dismissal order was subject to correction as a clerical
error presents a question of law, to be reviewed for correctness. C£, e.g., Lindsay v.
Atkm, 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984).
This issue was properly preserved by the Defendant's Reply to the Plaintiffs
Response to the Defendant's Motion to quash Writ of Garnishment (R. 448-454).
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Lietz?

1

It appears that all issues were properly preserved below.
In the event that they were not, Lietz claims that the Court should nonetheless
address them under the plain error doctrine. The plain error doctrine requires a showing
that an obvious and harmful error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial
rights, although the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error
occurred which is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See,
e.g.. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989);
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 2001 UT 89 at ^ 145, 432 Utah
Adv. Rep. 44.

This issue is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion, bearing in mind that
the law disfavors default judgments and that trial courts are to resolve doubts in this arena
in favor of setting aside default judgments. See, e.g., Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93
(Utah 1986).
This issue was properly preserved by the motion to set aside the judgment (R. 9132).
CONTROLLING RULES, STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The following rules, statute, and constitutional provision are determinative of this
appeal, and are in the addendum to this brief: United States Constitution, Amendment
XIV, § 1; Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rules 4-501 and 4-504; Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 6., 55 and 60; Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. DISPOSITION
Myra Margis named Bert Lietz in a civil complaint filed August 15, 1994, alleging
the following causes of action: intentional and malicious interference with prospective
economic relations, tortious interference with an economic enterprise, breach of contract,
conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (R. 1-13).
The factual gist of Margis' complaint was that Margis had borrowed $7,000 from
Lietz, and had posted the contents of the Carousel Social Club as collateral, and that
despite the fact that Margis honored her obligations under the promissory note, Lietz
seized the contents of the club, and thereby foiled Margis' agreement to sell the Carousel
Social Club to the owner of the Bombay House Restaurant (R. 1-13).
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The complaint sought $17,200 in damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages, but
the complaint was not verified or supported by any affidavit (R. 1-13).
Counsel for Lietz mailed an answer admitting and denying the allegations in the
complaint, and asserting as affirmative defenses that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action upon which relief could be granted, estoppel, and waiver of claims (R. 20-28).
On May 22, 1995, Judge Leslie A. Lewis set an order to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute (R. 29-30).
On June 5, 1995, counsel for Margis wrote to Judge Lewis' clerk, informing her
that the parties expected to settle the case or set it for trial shortly, and asking her to
refrain from dismissing the case (R. 31).
On August 8, 1995, counsel for Lietz appeared for a scheduling conference, but
because no one appeared for Margis, Judge Lewis dismissed the matter without prejudice
(R. 32).
On November 1, 1995, counsel for Margis moved to set aside the dismissal,
claiming a lack of notice of the scheduling conference on August 8, 1995, and on Januaiy
30, 1996, Judge Lewis granted the motion and set aside the dismissal, ordering the parties
to appear February 27, 1996 (R. 33-44; 45).
Counsel for Margis appeared at the scheduling conference, but counsel for Lietz
did not, and the court set a pre-trial date of June 14, 1996, and a trial date of July 8, 1996
(R. 49).
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At the pretrial conference on June 14, 1996, the trial court struck the trial date
because the parties had reached a stipulation settling the case, and the trial court
instructed counsel for Margis to prepare the order dismissing the case (R. 54; T.
6/14/1996 at 3-9). The parties agreed that they would indemnify one another as long as
Lietz returned certain property and paid Margis $750 within fourteen days (R. 6/14/1996
at 3-9).
At the healing, Ms. Margis expressed some concern about how satisfied she would
be with Mr. Lietz's performance in returning the property, but she eventually agreed to be
bound by the agreement (R. 6/14/1996 at 7).
The court specifically recognized that at the time performance was to be rendered,
counsel for Lietz, McPhee, would be out of town and would not be participating (R.
6/14/1996 at 8).
On July 23, 1996, Lietz filed a "Receipt and Indemnity Agreement" reflecting that
he and a witness, Jarrel Jackson, had taken $750 and various items of property to Margis,
but had left, because Margis and her lawyer had refused to sign the Receipt and
Indemnity Agreement (R. 55).
On November 9, 1997, Margis faxed a letter to the trial court, which letter was
directed to her attorney, criticizing his performance, vilifying Lietz in general and in his
failure to perform under the settlement agreement, and claiming that Margis never got her
day in court (R. 56-57).
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On January 5, 1998, Judge Lewis set the matter for a hearing on Margis' letter on
April 30, 1998 (R. 58).
On February 6, 1998, a representative for McPhee wrote to the court advising her
that McPhee was on active duty with the military and would be unavailable until early
July of 1998 (R. 64).
On May 13, 1998, Judge Lewis set a scheduling conference for August 14, 1998,
directing the attorneys to attempt to settle the case and directing the attorneys and both
parties to be present (R. 66). The Notice of Pretrial/Scheduling Conference stated,
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED.
Date: 08/14/1998
Time: 04:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor 0 N44
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
COUNSEL ARE TO HOLD MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT
DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THIS HEARING AND ARE TO BE
PREPARED TO REPORT ON ISSUES RESOLVED AND ISSUES IN
CONFLICT. IF THE CASE CANNOT BE SETTLED, A TRIAL DATE
WILL BE SCHEDULED.
THE COURT MAY IMPOSE OTHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO OPPOSING PARTIES, AS MAY SEEM
JUST IN THE CASE.
BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE
THE LAWSUIT MUST BE PRESENT.
(R. 66).
On July 31, 1998, counsel for Margis moved the court to enter findings of
contempt for Lietz' failure to comply with the settlement agreement, and in the event of
5

Lietz's failure to appear at the scheduling conference and make meaningful settlement
efforts, to strike the answer and to enter judgment in favor of Margis (R. 72-74).
On July 31, 1998, counsel for Margis also filed a Notice of Intent and Attempts to
Enter into Settlement Negotiations, indicating that counsel for Lietz, McPhee, had been
re-assigned by the military, and would not be available until August 24, 1998 (R. 75-76).
Thus, both opposing counsel and the trial court were notified that counsel for
Lietz, McPhee, was out of state, would not be able to attend the August 14, 1998 hearing,
and would not be able to appear until August 24, 1998 (R. 75-76).
On August 14, 1998, Lietz and counsel did not appear, and Judge Lewis granted
$980 in attorneys fees and travel costs to the plaintiff, and set the scheduling conference
for August 21, 1998 (R.78-79). The minute entry for August 14, 1998 indicated that the
Court would not preside over a trial or further hearing until Lietz paid the $980, and that
if Lietz or his counsel did not appear on August 21, 1998, the court would strike Lietz's
answer and enter judgment for the plaintiff (R. 79). The minute entry indicated that
counsel for Margis was to send notice of the August 21, 1998 hearing by mail and fax (R.
79).
The notices from the trial court and counsel for Margis were both mailed to
McPhee at his Salt Lake City office, despite the fact that counsel and the court were both
on notice that McPhee was in Missouri on military orders at the time the notices were
sent, as he would be on August 21, 1998 (R. 75-76).

6

On August 21, 1998, Lietz and counsel did not appear, and Judge Lewis granted
Margis' motion to strike the answer, and granted judgment in favor of Margis in the
amount of $67,200.00, plus attorney's fees (R. 88).
The court made no findings to support the award of the damages, $50,000 of
which were punitive damages, and all of which were sought in the unverified complaint,
but not documented or justified by affidavit or in any other fashion (R. 88).
The court specifically found that notice of the hearing went to counsel for Lietz,
McPhee, from counsel for Margis and from the court (R. 88). Judge Lewis signed the
judgment on August 28, 1998 (R. 89-90).
On September 2, 1998, counsel for Lietz moved to set aside the default judgment
under Utah R. Civ.P. 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(7), submitting a memorandum and affidavit
explaining that counsel for Lietz had received no notice that Lietz's purported contempt
would be heard at the August 14, 1998 or August 21, 1998 hearings, and was out of his
office and out of state under military orders when the August hearings occurred (R. 95132). The documents explained that McPhee was unable to attend the hearing because he
was under military order to be in Missouri at the time of the August 14, 1998 hearing, and
was unable to participate in settlement negotiations at the time ordered by the court, by
virtue of military orders prohibiting him from private practice of law during the relevant
time (R. 95-132). McPhee's affidavit reflected his understanding with the secretary of
counsel for Margis that the case was going to be rescheduled following August 24, 1998
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(R. 125).
On October 7, 1998, counsel for Lietz submitted the matter for decision (R. 133).
On October 8, 1998, counsel for Margis filed a response to the motion to set aside
the judgment and order of fees (R. 135-137).
On October 15, 1998, counsel for Lietz moved to strike the response to the motion
to set aside the judgment and fees, because the response was not timely filed, and was not
filed late with leave of the court under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6 (R. 138-143).
Margis wrote a letter to Judge Lewis filed October 15, 1998, vilifying Lietz and his
counsel, and urging Judge Lewis to grant Margis relief (R. 145-147).
On August 27, 1999, counsel for Margis filed a motion for order in supplemental
proceedings, for Lietz to appear and account for and retain his property for satisfaction of
the judgment (R. 148-152).
On September 27, 1999, James C. Ziter entered an appearance on behalf of Lietz
(R. 153).
On September 27, 1999, Ziter requested a hearing on the Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees (R. 151).
On September 28, 1999, Lietz was ordered to appear in supplemental proceedings
to account for his property (R. 154-55). This order was apparently served on Lietz's wife
at Lietz's address , but not on McPhee or Ziter (R. 155-157).
On May 24, 2000, counsel for Margis moved for a hearing on Lietz's Motion to
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Set Aside the Judgment (R. 158).
On September 14, 2000, Lietz, acting pro se, moved to dismiss the action for a
defective summons and failure to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a) and 4(c)(2) (R. 160171).
On September 19, 2000, counsel for Margis moved the court again for
Supplemental Proceedings requiring Lietz to appear and account for his properly (R.
172).
Counsel for Margis also filed a response to Lietz's motion to dismiss, arguing that
the defense was waived by the general appearance and filing of an answer on August 23,
1994 (R. 175-179).
On September 21, 2000, James Ziter withdrew from representing Lietz (R. 181).
On September 27, 2000, the court ordered Lietz to appear in supplemental
proceedings on October 5, 2000 (R. 183-184).
On September 28, 2000, counsel for Margis sent a notice to Lietz to file an
appearance or to appoint counsel and notify counsel for Margis within twenty days (R.
187-88).
Lietz tendered with the district court clerk the $980 in attorney fees and travel
costs ordered by Judge Lewis on August 14, 1998 as a precondition to holding any further
hearings on the case (R. 193).
On October 10, 2000, counsel for Lietz, McPhee, filed a second notice to submit
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the Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney's Fees (R. 189-193).
On October 10, 2000, McPhee filed a Notice of Change of Address (R. 194).
On October 12, 2000, counsel for Margis moved for Rule 11 sanctions for Lietz's
pro se motion to dismiss (R. 196-198), and in response, Lietz withdrew his motion to
dismiss (R. 199).
On October 27, 2000, Judge Lewis entered a signed minute entry denying the
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees (R. 201).
On December 4, 2000, both parties objected to proposed orders prepared by
opposing counsel (R. 207-208; 209-210).
On December 11, 2000, counsel for Lietz objected to the release of the funds held
in trust by the district court for the attorneys fees and travel expenses ordered on August
14, 1998 (R. 211-213). Lietz had tendered the $980 on October 5, 2000, because Judge
Lewis had refused to hear the case until the $980 was paid (R. 79, 193).
On December 18, 2000, over two years after the original notice to submit was filed
(R. 133), Judge Lewis signed an order denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment and
Award of Attorneys Fees (R. 214-215). Judge Lewis also entered an order that the $1,280
held in trust by the district court be released to Margis (R. 223).
On February 6, 2001, counsel for Lietz submitted a notice to submit Defendant's
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Response, Defendant's Proposed Order Regarding the
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees, Plaintiffs
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Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees, Plaintiffs Motion for the Release of Funds,
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to
Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorneys' Fees, and Defendant's Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for the Release of Funds (R. 227-243).
These documents asked the court to set aside the prior orders of December 18 and
19, 2001, and rule on pending matters (R. 236).
On March 12, 2001, Lietz, acting pro se, filed a certificate of personal service of
the order of dismissal dated June 16, 1996, and an affidavit of Daniel Shanthakumar
contradicting allegations in Margis' original complaint that he had offered to buy the
Carousel Club (R. 245-248).
Lietz also prepared an order of dismissal with prejudice, reflecting the parties'
original resolution of June 14, 1996, and Judge Lewis signed the order of dismissal with
prejudice, effective June 14, 1996, on March 14, 2001 (R. 253-255).
The order of dismissal signed by Judge Lewis is a detailed, three page ruling,
referring to the transcript of June 14, 1996, which was attached (R. 253-255).
Lietz also filed a Subpoena Duces Tecum ordering Margis' former landlord to
provide documents concerning Margis' rental and eviction of the Carousel Club, "for
court purposes only to determine if the defendant has committed perjury." (R. 269). It
appears that the responsive documents are in the court file (R. 270-344).
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On April 10, 2001, counsel for Margis filed obtained Writs of Garnishment,
seeking to collect the judgment from First Security Bank, from America First Credit
Union (R. 345-363).
On July 5, 2001, counsel for Lietz moved the Court to quash and recall the writ of
garnishment, based on the dismissal order signed March 14, 2001 (R. 363-371).
Counsel for Margis moved to strike the order of dismissal as a clerical error, and
sought a hearing (R. 372-430).
On July 15, 2001, counsel for Margis field a Reply to Defendant's Motion to
Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment (R. 431-442).
On July 20, 2001, counsel for Lietz moved the court to enlarge the time in which
to reply to the Plaintiffs Reply (R. 443-444).
On August 3, 2001, counsel for Margis submitted the Motion to Strike Order and
the Motion to Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment for decision (R. 445).
On August 13, 2001, counsel for Lietz filed the Defendant's Reply to the
Plaintiffs Response to the Defendant's Motion to quash Writ of Garnishment, arguing
that the order of dismissal was a nunc pro tunc order, which correctly reflected the
dismissal which occurred on June 14, 1996, and arguing that all court filings after June
14, 1996, were legal nullities (R. 448-454). Counsel also moved to strike all of Margis's
pleadings from October 10, 2000 to the present (R. 455-456). He submitted this for
decision on August 16, 2001, along with the Motion to Quash and Recall Garnishment
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and the Motion to Enlarge Time (R. 461-466).
On August 22, 2001, Judge Lewis entered the "Court's Ruling," clarifying the
order of December 18, 2000, and striking the order of dismissal on the theory that it was
unclear that the parties ever reached an "accord and satisfaction" (R. 470). The court
denied the Defendant's Motion to Quash and Recall the Writ of Garnishment (R. 471),
and also indicated that the Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs Response to the Motion to Set
Aside, Motion to Release Funds and Objection to the Plaintiffs proposed order were
denied (R. 469-470). The court also denied the motion to strike the plaintiffs pleadings
filed after October 10, 2000 (R. 471).
Counsel for Lietz filed a timely notice of appeal on September 20, 2001 (R. 476).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Mr. Lietz was never allowed to try his case before the judgment entered,
there are no additional facts in the record pertaining to this appeal, other than those stated
in the Statement of the Case, supra.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in striking the order dismissing the case, which correctly
stated the court's order dismissing the case on June 14, 1996.
The court's ruling explaining the striking of the dismissal order reflects that the
court viewed the entry of the dismissal order as a judicial, rather than clerical error.
The dismissal order actually was not erroneous, but correctly reflected the trial
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court's order to dismiss the case with prejudice, which was reached after the parties stated
their stipulation for an out-of-court resolution of the case on the record. The order of
dismissal should be treated as a valid nunc pro tunc order, and relate back to June 14,
1996, rendering all subsequent inconsistent filings in this case nullities.
The trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment. Lietz timely
moved to set it aside, has numerous meritorious defenses to the complaint, and his default
falls within rule 60(b).
As opposing counsel and the trial court were aware, during the August 14, 1998
and August 21, 1998 hearings wherein the default was set up and entered, counsel for
Lietz was unavailable because he was under military orders requiring him to be out of
state and prohibiting him from participating until August 24, 1998. The record is
unrefuted in demonstrating that counsel for Lietz spoke to the secretary of counsel for
Margis in advance of the August hearings and obtained the assurance that the matter
would be rescheduled when counsel was available, on or after August 24, 1998.
Additionally, the August 14, 1998 hearing was designed to adjudicate Lietz's
alleged contempt of the settlement, but no affidavit detailing his allegedly contemptuous
conduct was ever filed.
On these facts, the trial court's order denying Lietz his day in court and leaving
him to pay a judgment near $70,000, including $50,000 in punitive damages, in the
complete absence of any affidavits or other form of evidence to sustain the damages
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awarded, reflects an abuse of discretion and requires reversal.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
STRIKING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At the pretrial conference on June 14, 1996, the trial court struck the trial date
because the parties had reached a stipulation settling the case, and the trial court
instructed counsel for Margis to prepare the order dismissing the case (R. 54; T.
6/14/1996 at 3-9). The parties agreed that they would indemnify one another as long as
Lietz returned certain property and paid Margis $750 within fourteen days (R. 6/14/1996
at 3-9). At the hearing, Ms. Margis expressed some concern about how satisfied she
would be with Mr. Lietz's performance in returning the property, but she eventually
agreed to be bound by the agreement (R. 6/14/1996 at 7). The court specifically
recognized that at the time performance was to be rendered, counsel for Lietz, McPhee,
would be out of town and would not be participating (R. 6/14/1996 at 8).
On July 23, 1996, Lietz filed a "Receipt and Indemnity Agreement" reflecting that
he and a witness, Jarrel Jackson, had taken $750 and various items of property to Margis,
but had left, because Margis and her lawyer had refused to sign the Receipt and
Indemnity Agreement (R. 55).
On November 9, 1997, Margis faxed a letter to the trial court, which letter was
15

directed to her attorney, criticizing his performance, vilifying Lietz in general and in his
failure to perform under the settlement agreement, and claiming that Margis never got her
day in court (R. 56-57).
On January 5, 1998, Judge Lewis set the matter for a hearing on Margis' letter on
April 30, 1998 (R. 58).
On February 6, 1998, a representative for McPhee wrote to the court advising her
that McPhee was on active duty with the military and would be unavailable until early
July of 1998 (R. 64).
On May 13, 1998, Judge Lewis set a scheduling conference for August 14, 1998,
directing the attorneys to attempt to settle the case and directing the attorneys and both
parties to be present (R. 66). The Notice of Pretrial/Scheduling Conference stated,
PRETRIAL/SCHEDULING CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED.
Date: 08/14/1998
Time: 04:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor 0 N44
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
COUNSEL ARE TO HOLD MEANINGFUL SETTLEMENT
DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO THIS HEARING AND ARE TO BE
PREPARED TO REPORT ON ISSUES RESOLVED AND ISSUES IN
CONFLICT. IF THE CASE CANNOT BE SETTLED, A TRIAL DATE
WILL BE SCHEDULED.
THE COURT MAY IMPOSE OTHER SANCTIONS, SUCH AS AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO OPPOSING PARTIES, AS MAY SEEM
JUST IN THE CASE.
BOTH COUNSEL AND PARTIES WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE
THE LAWSUIT MUST BE PRESENT.
16

(R. 66).
On July 31, 1998, counsel for Margis moved the court to enter findings of
contempt for Lietz' failure to comply with the settlement agreement, and in the event of
Lietz's failure to appear at the scheduling conference and make meaningful settlement
efforts, to strike the answer and to enter judgment in favor of Margis (R. 72-74). On
August 14, 1998, Lietz and counsel did not appear, and Judge Lewis granted $980 in
attorneys fees and travel costs to the plaintiff, and set the scheduling conference for
August 21, 1998 (R.78-79). The minute entry for August 14, 1998 indicates that if Lietz
or his counsel did not appear on August 21, 1998, the court would strike Lietz's answer
and enter judgment for the plaintiff (R. 79).
On August 21, 1998, Lietz and counsel did not appear, and Judge Lewis granted
Margis' motion to strike the answer, and granted judgment in favor of Margis in the
amount of $67,200.00, plus attorney's fees (R. 88). The court specifically found that
notice of the hearing went to counsel for Lietz, McPhee, from counsel for Margis and
from the court (R. 88). Judge Lewis signed the judgment on August 28, 1998 (R. 89-90).
On March 12, 2001, Lietz, acting pro se, filed a certificate of personal service of
the order of dismissal dated June 16, 1996, and an affidavit of Daniel Shanthakumar
contradicting allegations in Margis' original complaint that he had offered to buy the
Carousel Club (R. 245-248).
Lietz also prepared an order of dismissal, reflecting the parties' original resolution

17

of June 14, 1996, and Judge Lewis signed the order of dismissal with prejudice, effective
June 14, 1996, on March 14, 2001 (R. 253-255).
The order of dismissal signed by Judge Lewis is a detailed, three page ruling,
referring to the transcript of June 14, 1996, which was attached (R. 253-255).
Counsel for Margis moved to strike the order of dismissal as a clerical error, and
sought a hearing (R. 372-430).
On August 13, 2001, counsel for Lietz filed the Defendant's Reply to the
Plaintiffs Response to the Defendant's Motion to quash Writ of Garnishment, arguing
that the order of dismissal was a nunc pro tunc order, which correctly reflected the
dismissal which occurred on June 14, 1996, and arguing that all court filings after June
14, 1996, were legal nullities (R. 448-454).
On August 22, 2001, Judge Lewis entered the "Court's Ruling," striking the order
of dismissal, because it was unclear that the parties ever reached an "accord and
satisfaction" (R. 470). The ruling states, in relevant part,
It appears that this matter came before the Court for a pre-trial
conference on June 14, 1996. According to the Minutes for this conference,
the parties indicated to the Court that they had reached a stipulation. The
stipulation was read into the record and the trial date was stricken. Counsel
for the plaintiff was instructed to prepare the Order dismissing the case
based on the stipulation.
In response to a letter written to the court by the plaintiff, dated
November 3, 1997, the Court scheduled a hearing for April 30, 1998. For
unclear reasons, it does not appear that this hearing was ever held. Instead,
because an Order of dismissal was never prepared, the Court scheduled a
pretrial/scheduling conference for August 14, 1998.
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On March 12, 2001, the Court received an Order of Dismissal that
was filed by the defendant on a/?ro se basis. The Court entered this Order
on March 14, 2001, because at first glance it appeared to reflect the reality
that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction during the June 14, 1996,
hearing before the Court. However, since the plaintiff filed her Motion to
Strike Order, the Court has had an opportunity to further reflect on the
propriety of this Order and whether it indeed conflicts with the events that
transpired after the June 14, 1996, hearing and with the existing Judgment
and Order already entered by the Court on August 28, 1998. The Court now
determines that the Order of Dismissal does conflict with the prior
Judgment and Order. In addition, it is not clear to the Court that the parties
ever reached an accord and satisfaction because a formal Order dismissing
the case based on the June 14, 1996, stipulation was never prepared and
entered. Accordingly, the Court grants the plaintiffs Motion to Strike and
vacates the Order of Dismissal entered on March 14, 2001. Furthermore,
the defendant's Motion to Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment, which is
based on the now-vacated Order of Dismissal, is also denied.
(R. 467-47l)(Emphasis by the trial court).
B. THE LAW
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) provides,
(a) Clerical mistakes.
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal,
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
Margis argued in the memorandum supporting the motion to strike the dismissal
order that the court could strike the dismissal under this rule as a clerical error (R. 393400).
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The dismissal order does not constitute a clerical error, however, because clerical
errors occur when a trial court's judgment is improperly recorded, and are distinguished
from judicial errors, which occur when trial courts make substantive errors See, e g ,
Lindsay v Atkui 680 P 2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984)2 As the court explamed there,
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error
does not depend upon who made it Rather, it depends on
whether it was made m rendermg the judgment or m
recording the judgment as rendered 46 Am Jur 2d
Judgments §§ 202
Richards v Siddowav. 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 P 2d 143, 145 (1970)
(emphasis added) The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual mtention of the court and
parties 6A Moore's Federal Practice para 60 60[l](2ded 1983) Rule
60(a) is not mtended to correct errors of a substantial nature, particularly
where the claim of error is unilateral The fact that an mtention was
subsequenlly found to be mistaken would not cause the mistake to be
"clerical" See Bershadv McDonough. 469 F 2d 1333 (7th Cir 1972)
Lindsay at 402
As the language of the trial court's ruling, quoted above, reflects, there was no
clerical error m the entry of the dismissal order, which correctly reflected Judge Lewis'
assessment when she signed it that the parties had settled the case (R 467-471) The
order of dismissal signed by Judge Lewis is a detailed, three page rulmg, referring to the
transcript of June 14, 1996, which was attached (R 253-255)

2

In Lindsay, the trial court granted a dismissal with prejudice to one party, and on
appeal, the court rejected the argument that the error was correctable under 60(a), because
while the judgment may have been substantively erroneous, there was no clerical erroi in
its entry
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Margis' alternative arguments in support of striking the dismissal order, that the
judgment is void or reflects an oversight in the record, and was subject to being stricken
under subsections (4) and (6) of Rule 60(b) are likewise without merit, because the order
of dismissal order was not void or an oversight, but correctly stated the trial court's
intention on June 14, 1996 to dismiss the case with prejudice.
As was argued in the trial court (R. 448-454), the trial court's order was valid as a
nunc pro tunc order. In Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984),3 the court
recognized "[t]hat a nunc pro tunc order is not to make an order now for then, but to enter
for then an order previously made." Id. at 299. Under this doctrine, "the court's act is
effective earlier so that the record accurately reflects what happened, a nunc pro tunc
order is used to make the record speak the truth." Furthermore, the purpose of a nunc pro
tunc order is to reflect the content of a previous order. Id. see also Diehl Lumber
Transportation Inc. v. Glen J. Mickelson d/b/a/ Glen's Service Company, 802 P.2d 739,
742 (Utah App. 1990)("The function of a nunc pro tunc order is not to correct some
affirmative action of the court which ought to have been taken, but its purpose is to
correct the record which has been made, so that it will truly express the action taken but

3

In Preece, the court reversed a trial court's granting of a divorce nunc pro tunc to
the date prior to the husband's death, because the decree was not final when the husband
died.
In Home v Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. 1987), this Court recognized that
since Preece, the legislature had enacted legislation granting trial courts broader
discretion to enter orders nunc pro tunc in domestic relations cases.
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which, through inadvertence or mistake was not truly recorded.").4
In this case, the trial court's dismissal order was entirely consistent with her order
of June 14, 1996, albeit that it was Mr. Lietz who prepared the dismissal order, rather than
counsel for Margis.
The transcript of the June 14, 1996 hearing reflects that the court ordered the case
dismissed with prejudice, but that counsel for Margis failed to prepare the dismissal
order, as required by Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
There is no evidence to marshal in support of the trial court's finding that the court
was unsure that there was an "accord and satisfaction" reached by the parties, because the
June 14, 1996 heairing transcript, in the Addendum to this brief, clearly states the terms of
the agreement and reflects the agreement of both parties to be bound thereto.
The trial court's use of the term "accord and satisfaction" was legally erroneous,
because the dismissal order of June 14, 1996 and reflected in that transcript was based on
a stipulation of the parties, and did not involve an accord and satisfaction, as that contract
term is defined by law. Cf., e ^ , Pro Max Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4 at ^f 21, 998
P.2d 254, 259 ("'An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract agree
that a different performance, to be made in substitution of the performance originally
agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under the original agreement.' Golden
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). A party
4

In Diehl Lumber, this Court reversed a trial court's order permitting the filing of a
third party complaint, because the order was not truly nunc pro tunc.
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seeking to prove an accord and satisfaction must show (1) an unliquidated claim or a bona
fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment offered as full settlement of the entire
dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the dispute. See
Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985).").
Because the order of dismissal correctly reflected the trial court's intention as of
June 14, 1996, it is to have legal effect relating back to that date, and nullifies all
subsequent and inconsistent orders. See Don Houston v. Intermountain Health Care Inc.,
933 P.2d 403, 406-407 (Utah App. 1997) ("A nunc pro tunc order allows the court to
enter an order which correctly reflects ruling previously made which, therefore, relates
back to that previous ruling. See Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984);
Bagshaw v. Bagshaw. 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990).").5
It is clear in this case that the dismissal order was correct when it was entered, and
should be read as controlling all events following June 14, 1996, rendering the subsequent
pleadings and orders inconsistent therewith, particularly the judgments and orders against
Lietz, legal nullities. See id.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The trial court originally ordered judgment in favor of Margis in an unsigned
5

In Dan Houston, the Court found that it had jurisdiction over an appeal filed in
1993, based on a 1995 nunc pro tunc order correcting a technical deficiency in a 1993
order.
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minute entry on August 21, 1998, which stated,
Based on the failure of Mr Mcphie [sic] to appear at this time, the Court
grants Mr Pace's request to have the pleadings stricken. The court finds
that notice went to Mr. Mcphie [sic] by the court and by Mr Pace. The
judgment in the amount of $67,200.00 is granted with interest to accrue
from the date of 8/21/98. Attorney fees are granted. Mr. Pace to submit
affidavit with billing and order.
(R. 88). The order signed by the court on August 28, 1998 states,
The parties came before the Court on August 21, 1998 at the hour of
4:00 pm for the scheduled pretrial conference. The Court had previously
ordered that non appearance by the Defendant would result in his Answer
being stricken and with default being entered against him in the amount
plead in the Complaint.
The Plaintiffs counsel was present and plaintiff was available by
phone as ordered by the Court, Defendant was not present and noone [sic]
appeared representing the Defendant. After reviewing the file, after finding
that Defendant did not appear and noone appeared representing him, and for
good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendant's Answer is stricken and Default is hereby entered
against the Defendant.
2. Judgment is hereby entered against the Defendant in the amount of
$67,200.00 plus after accruing judgment rate of interest, costs and attorneys
fees until paid.
3. The judgment amount shall be increased be the plaintiffs
reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $2,980.00, an amount supported
by affidavat [sic] as to fees.
(R. 89-90).
Neither of these documents makes any specific finding to justify the award of
$50,000 in punitive damages, or refers to any evidentiary basis for the damages awarded.
The Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees,
Supporting Memorandum, Affidavit of Jerold D. McPhee and other supporting
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documents filed September 2, 1998, clearly establish that McPhee had no notice that
Lietz's purported contempt would be heard at the August 14, 1998 or August 21, 1998
hearings, that McPhee was unable to attend either hearing or participate in settlement
negotiations prior to the hearings because he was out of state under military orders which
prohibited him from practicing law until he was released from the orders, and that
McPhee was told by the secretary of counsel for Margis prior to August 14, 1998, that the
matter would be rescheduled to a time when McPhee became available, after August 24,
1998 (R. 95-132).
The Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was not properly opposed. The
Plaintiffs untimely and objected-to Response to the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment
and Award of Attorney Fees did not refute by affidavit or otherwise that McPhee had
been told by the secretary of counsel for Margis that the matter would be rescheduled so
that McPhee could be present and participate, but generally complained that McPhee
should have made arrangements for someone to appear in court on his behalf, and argued
that if the court set aside the judgment, parties could avoid their responsibilities to court
by hiring attorneys who are out of the jurisdiction (R. 135-137).6

6

Counsel for Lietz moved to strike Margis' response to Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees, because the response was filed on October
8, 1998, when it was due on September 12, 1998 under Utah Code of Judicial
Administration Rule 4-501(l)(B), which provides,
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days
after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and
all supporting documentation.
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The record is devoid of any explanation for the court's denial of the motion to set
aside the default judgment, which denial was entered over two years after the original
notice to submit was filed because Judge Lewis refused to proceed on the case until Lietz
paid $980 in travel and attorney fees for the August 14, 1998 hearing, which his attorney
could not attend because he was in service to the military (R. 79, 133).
The minute entry dated October 27, 2000 states,
A notice to submit has been filed, pursuant to rule 4-501, code of Judicial
Administration, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and Award of Attorneys Fees. The Court after having considered
the motion and reviewing all the pleadings and the court's file, the Court
denies the motion. The previous Order and Award of Fees remains in
place.
(R. 201).
The court's order signed December 18, 2000, states,
The Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of
Attorney Fees came before this Court on the Defendant's second Notice to
Submit on October 6, 2000. Defendant was represented by counsel Jerold
McPhee, and the Plaintiff was represented by Nathan D. Pace, P.C. The
Court after having considered the motion and reviewing all the pleadings
and the Court's file, the Court denies the motion. The previous Order and
Award of Fees remains in place.
(R. 214).

(R. 138-143).
In her ruling dated August 22, 2001, Judge Lewis denied the Motion to Strike
without explanation (R. 470). Inasmuch as the motion was clearly filed out of time under
4-501(B), and because no motion was filed to justify the untimely filing under Utah
R.Civ.P. 6(b), the trial court erred in denying the motion to strike. See id.
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The Court's ruling, dated August 22, 2001, wherein the court clarified the
December 18, 2000 order, does not explain the basis for denying the motion to set aside,
but did indicate that the basis for the motion to set aside the judgment was that McPhee
"had been on military duty during the time that the two hearings were scheduled and was
unable to attend[,]" and did not recognize that the motion to set aside was also based on
the fact that counsel did not receive notice that Lietz's purported contempt would be
heard on August 14, 1998 or August 21, 1998, but was informed by the secretary of
counsel for Margis that the matter would be rescheduled after August 24, 1998, so that
McPhee could be present and participate (R. 468).
B. THE LAW
1. Assessment of Damages without Evidence
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of default judgments. It states,
(a) Default.
(1) Entry.
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief
is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided
by these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall
enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default.
After the entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give
such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these
rules to be served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the
event that it is necessary for the court to conduct a hearing
with regard to the amount of damages of the nondefaulting
party.
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(b) Judgment.
Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk.
When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for a sum
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made
certain, and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside
of this state, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff shall enter
judgment for the amount due and costs against the defendant,
if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not
an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court.
In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default
shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the
court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect it is necessary
to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or
to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make
an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct
such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary
and proper.
(c) Setting aside default.
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants.
The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment
by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a
cross-claini or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to
the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof.
No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against
an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
(Emphasis added)
As this Court explained in Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768
P 2d 950 (Utah App. 1989),
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The procedure for assessing damages after the entry of a default judgment is
governed by Rule 55(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant
to Rule 55, when a plaintiffs claim is for other than a sum certain or an
amount that by computation can be made certain, judgment must be entered
by the court and "if, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages . . . . the court may conduct such hearings or order such
references as it deems necessary and proper. " Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)
(emphasis added).
Id. at 962.
In the instant matter, prior to awarding any specific damages, at a minimum, Judge
Lewis should have held an evidentiary hearing. See id. As the court directed in Skanchy
v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998),
A clerk of the court may enter a default judgment if a defendant
defaults and if the complaint seeks damages for a "sum certain or for a sum
which can by computation be made certain." Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b).
However, if the damages claimed are unliquidated, a default judgment can
be entered only by a judge. See Russell v. Marteli 681 P.2d 1193, 1195
(Utah 1984). To enter a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a judge
must review the complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid
claim for relief, and award damages in an amount that is supported by some
valid evidence. In other words, the allegations in the complaint are not a
sufficient basis for awarding unliquidated damages. See Larsen v. Collina,
684 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1984). That usually means a hearing must be held so
that the plaintiff can provide evidentiary support for the award of damages.
Skanchy at 1076.
While a default judgment reflects that the defaulting party is liable for each cause
of action stated in the complaint, it is still the burden of the prevailing party to justify the
amount of damages claimed by competent evidence. See, e.g.. Arnica Mutual Insurance
Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah App. 1989).
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While it is possible for parties to sustain their evidentiary burden in seeking
damages with appropriate affidavits detailing the "nature and extent of damages
incurred," e.g., Schettler, 768 P.2d at 963, no such affidavits were filed in this case.
In assessing the amount of punitive damages to award, trial courts are to consider
seven factors:
(1) the relative wealth of the defendant, (2) the nature of the alleged
misconduct, (3) the facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct,
(4) the effect thereof upon the lives of the plaintiff and others, (5) the
probability of future recurrence of the misconduct, (6) the relationship
between the parties, and (7) the amount of actual damages awarded.
Schettler, 768 P.2d at 967.
In the instant matter, there was no evidentiary hearing on damages, and there were
no affidavits filed in support of the damages sought in the unverified complaint. The
record does not reflect that the trial court considered the necessary factors in awarding
$50,000 in punitive damages, nor could she have, because the relevant and necessary
evidence was never before the court. Cf., Security Adjustment Bureau v. West, 437 P.2d
214, 216 (Utah 1968)(Ellett, J., concurring)(trial court could not award punitive damages
without taking evidence).
Because the damage award in this case was never properly sustained by evidence,
at a minimum, this Court should remand the matter for the consideration of evidence on
the issue of damages. See Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984)(court
reversed damage award, because the damages due were not "sums certain," and thus the
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trial court needed to hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the damages). Cf, e.g.,
Schettler, supra, 768 P.2d at 964-68 (Court remanded for recomputation of general and
punitive damages).
2. Failure to Set Aside Default
Judgments by default are not favored by the courts nor are they in
the interest of justice and fair play. No one has an inalienable or
constitutional right to a judgment by default without a hearing on the merits.
The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case.
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962).
The rule governing withdrawal of default judgments, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
60 provides,

(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding
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or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
Trial courts are normally granted discretion in ruling on motions to set aside
default judgments under Rule 60(b), but the law disfavors default judgments and trial
courts are to resolve doubts in this arena in favor of setting aside default judgments. See,
e.g., Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). Unless there is proof that setting aside
a default judgment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, any reasonable excuse
justifies setting aside default judgments. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Supply
Company v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).7 As the Larsen court explained in
reversing an order of dismissal,
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the business of the court with
efficiency and expedition the trial court should have a reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move
forward according to the rules and the directions of the court, without
justifiable excuse. But that prerogative falls short of unreasonable and
arbitrary action which will result in injustice. Whether there is such
justifiable excuse is to be determined by considering more factors than
merely the length of time since the suit was filed. Some consideration
should be given to the conduct of both parties, and to the opportunity each
has had to move the case forward and what they have done about it; and
also what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side;
and most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal.
Id. at 878-879 (footnotes omitted).

7

In Larsen, the court reversed the trial court's order dismissing a case for delays
caused by the plamtiff s extended efforts to comply with the discovery request. See id. at
879.
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By reviewing the record in the instant case in light of the appropriate factors, it is
clear that the trial court abused her discretion in refusing to set aside the default
judgment. The record demonstrates that the case was once dismissed for Margis' failure
to prosecute (R. 32), and is completely uncontradicted in indicating that the reasons that
Lietz did not appear for the August hearings were that his counsel was under military
orders that prohibited his attendance and participation at that time, and was told by the
secretary of Margis' attorney that the matter would be rescheduled when McPhee became
available on August 24, 1998 (R. 95-132).
Particularly where Ms. Margis previously agreed to settle the matter despite her
reservations, and then backed out (R. 6/14/1996 at 7; R. 55-57), and where there has
never been a claim that Margis would be prejudiced by setting aside the default judgment,
leaving Mr. Lietz to pay a $70,000 judgment without ever having had a trial or fair notice
of the impending default constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the Larsen court
concluded,
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and to move
calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even
more important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice
between them. In conformity with that principle the courts generally tend to
favor granting relief from default judgments where there is any reasonable
excuse, unless it will result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the
adverse party.
Id. at 879.
This Court has required a party seeking relief from a default judgment to make a
tripartite showing: that he timely moved for relief in the trial court, that he has a
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mentonous defense, and that the default was caused by a reason listed in Rule 60(b) See
Black's Title Inc v Utah State Ins Dept 1999 UT App 330,1} 6, 991 P 2d 607, 610
In this case, the motion to set aside the judgment was timely Once the trial court
entered the default on August 28, 1998 (R 89-90), counsel timely moved to set it aside on
September 2, 1998 (R 95-132)
Mr Lietz has numerous meritorious defenses to the complamt, as reflected in his
demals and the affirmative defenses in his answer (R 20-28) In his answer, Lietz demed
most material allegations, including those pertaining to the terms of the promissory note,
Margis' performance of her obligations under the promissory note, his alleged conversion
of Carousel Social Club assets and the assets of its customers, his alleged breach of
contract, the impending sale of the club to the Bombay House Restaurant, his mtent to
cause emotional distress, and the damages caused by his actions (R 20-28) Additionally,
the court file contains an affidavit from the owner of the Bombay House Restaurant,
specifically denying the allegations m the complamt that he was gomg to purchase the
Carousel Social Club from Ms Margis (R 245-248)
The reason for the default falls clearly within rule 60(b) Under subsection (1), a
court may set aside a ruling for "mistake, inadvertence, surpnse, or excusable neglect"
Because the trial court was notified m July that McPhee was under military orders
and unable to participate until August 24, 1998, the schedulmg of the August 14 and
August 21 hearings should be viewed as mistake or inadvertence on the court's part,
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which surprised McPhee, who had made arrangements with the secretary of counsel for
Margis to set the hearing when McPhee was able to attend and participate (R. 75-76, 95132). See id.
Alternatively, counsel's and Lietz's failure to appear are fairly characterized as
excusable neglect. As the Court recognized in Black's Title, to show excusable neglect
under the rule, a party must show that he "'used due diligence and that he was prevented
from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.'" Id. at ^[10, 991 P.2d at
611.
Here, counsel for Lietz was under military orders from the U.S. Government which
prevented him from being present or participating in the August hearings, and made
arrangements with the secretary of counsel for Margis to reschedule the matter until he
was available, three days after the hearing occurred (R. 95-132). The record reflects that
opposing counsel and the trial court were notified prior to the final hearing that McPhee
could not attend until August 24, for on July 31, 1998, counsel for Margis also filed a
Notice of Intent and Attempts to Enter into Settlement Negotiations, indicating that
counsel for Lietz, McPhee, had been re-assigned by the military, and would not be
available until August 24, 1998 (R. 75-76). Compare Black's Title, supra ("Here, Black
merely asserted that he was under a doctor's care and unable to work. He neither
described the illness, nor explained how it wholly prevented him from taking the steps
required to maintain contact with counsel, Black's Title, or the Department. In the absence
of such a showing, Black's assertion does not demonstrate his neglect was excusable.").
Assuming arguendo, but not conceding, that counsel for Lietz was at fault for
obeying the military orders from the United States government which prevented his
presence in Judge Lewis's court, the trial court should not have punished Lietz for any
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shortcoming on the part of counsel. This is verified by reference to McKean v. Mountain
View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 1966), in which the trial court granted a
default judgment against the defendants after their attorney appeared twenty-seven
minutes late for trial, because the attorney had been trying to obtain a writ of prohibition
from the Utah Supreme Court to halt the trial, because his witnesses were unavailable.
See id- at 129-130. In reversing the default judgment, the supreme court explained,
The object to be desired in this as in all cases is the searching out of the
truth and doing justice between the parties in regard to the controversy between
them. To Cctrry out that purpose it is the policy of the law to favor a trial on
the merits and to afford both sides a full opportunity to present their evidence
and contentions as to disputed issues so they may be disposed of on substantial
rather than upon technical grounds. Accordingly courts should exercise
caution in regard to default judgments and should be somewhat indulgent in
setting them aside. In order to achieve the objectives just stated it
is sometimes necessary to look beyond what may appear to be ill-advised,
or even irritating or contemptuous conduct of counsel to the adjudication of
the rights of the parties to the action. It should be kept in mind that their
rights and amy such misconduct of counsel are separate and distinct things which
should be dealt with separately.
The purpose of a default judgment is to conclude litigation when a defendant
fails to plead or otherwise defend an action. In such circumstances its use
is practical and salutary. However, it was never intended to
be used as a means of disciplining attorneys who may be derelict in the
performance of their duties. If such a course were followed it may do a grave
mjustice to the client by punishing him rather than the attorney who has done
the wrong.
Id. at 130-31 (footnotes omitted).
Likewise here, if Judge Lewis had a desire to discipline counsel, McPhee, she
should have proceeded accordingly, but had no business entering a default judgment
against Lietz. See id.
Subsection (7) of Rule 60(b) permits relief from judgment "for any other reason
justifying relief..."
One other reason justifying relief in this case is that Margis sought the August 14,
hearings to adjudicate Lietz's being in contempt of the settlement agreement (R. 72-74)
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While the motion for the hearing and Ms. Margis's letters in the court file cast numerous
aspersions on Mr. Lietz, there was never any affidavit filed to detail his allegedly
contemptuous actions. In a case of indirect contempt, or contempt allegedly occurring
outside the presence of the court, an affidavit is required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3,
which states,
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence
of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed in Section 7832-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view
and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a
statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial officers.
As the courts have recognized, the contempt affidavit lacking in this case is an
element of due process, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, necessary to inform the court and person accused of contempt of the
allegedly contemptuous conduct to be adjudicated. See, e.g.. Khan v. Khan, 921 P.2d
466, 468 (Utah App. 1996).8 Because Lietz thus did not obtain proper notice and due
process, this is a further basis for relief from the judgment flowing from that hearing
under 60(b)(7).
Because Lietz timely moved for relief from judgment, has meritorious defenses to

8

In Khan, this Court reversed a finding of indirect contempt for violation of
a child visitation order, finding that Mr. Khan had received constitutionally inadequate
notice. Id. at 470.
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present, has justified the default under rule 60(b), and would be grossly prejudiced by the
denial of his day in court, this Court should reverse the trial courts' orders denying his
motion to set aside the default judgment. See Black's Title; Larsen, supra.
CONCLUSION
This Court should rule that the trial court erred in striking the dismissal order, and
recognize the order as a valid nunc pro tunc order, which nullifies all subsequent
inconsistent filings in this case.
At a minimum, the Court should hold that the trial court abused her discretion in
failing to set aside the default judgment, reverse the order refusing to set aside the default
judgment and all related Qfjiers, and remand this case to the trial court for trial.
Dated this

\ ^

day of.

Certificate of Mailing/Delivery
I, Jerold D. McPhee, counsel for Mr. Lietz , hereby certify that I have caused to be
hand-delivered/inailed, first-class postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing document to Nathan D. Pace and David Pace, 136 South Main, #404, Salt Lake
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City, Utah 84101 / "

day of

Counsel forMFTLietz
Mailed/delivered accordingly this

^

day of

A{C^

i 7

T^
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Rulings of the Trial Court

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,
vs .

Case No: 940905177 CV

BERT LIETZ,
Defendant,

Clerk:

MINUTES
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

Judge:
Date:

LESLIE LEWIS
August 14, 1998

chells

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): MYRA MARGIS
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): NATHAN D. PACE
Video

HEARING
Based on the failure to appear of the defendant and his counsel,
the Court grants attorney fees in the amount of $480'. 00, further
the plaintiff is awarded travel costs in the amount of $500.00.
The defendant is to pay the amounts before the case will
proceed to trial or hearing.
At the next hearing the plaintiff may appear by telephone.
The court orders failure to appear by the defendant or an attorney
for the defendant (Mr McPhie or partners) will result in the
defendant pleadings being stricken and a judgment will enter for
the plaintiff. The next hearing is set for 8/21/98 at 4:00 pm
Counsel for the plaintiff is to send notice by mail and by fax to
Mr McPhie.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
INCOURT NOTE

vs.

Case No: 940905177 CV

BERT LIETZ,
Defendant.

Clerk:

Judge:
Date:

LESLIE LEWIS
August 21, 1998

chells

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): NATHAN D. PACE
Video

Based on the failure of Mr Mcphie to appear at this time, the Court
grants Mr Pace's request to have the pleadings stricken. The Court
finds that notice went to Mr Mcphie by the court and Mr Pace. The
judgment in the amount of $67,200.00 is granted
with interest to accrue from the date of 8/21/98. Attorney fees
are granted. Mr Pace to submit affidavit with billing and order.

Page 1 (last)

ED DISTRICT COURT
*MAG£$hird
Judicial District

AUG 2 8 1333

NATHAN D. PACE, (6626)
136 SOUTH, MAIN STREET SUITE 404
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700
Attorney for Plaintiff

SALT Ulffi COUNTY ^
Deputy Clerk

ENTERED IN RSGPTRY
Or JUDGMENTS

PATE

/Epl^i f

—

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 940905177CV
BERT LIETZ,
Judge: Leslie Lewis

Defendant.

The parties came before the Court on August 21, 1998 at the hour of 4:00pm for the
scheduled pretrial conference. The Court had previously ordered that non appearance by the
Defendant would result in his Answer being stricken and with default being entered against him
in the amount plead in the Complaint.
The Plaintiffs counsel was present and plaintiff was available by phone as ordered by the
Court, Defendant was not present and noone appeared representing Defendant. After reviewing
the file, after finding mat Defendant did not appear and noone appeared representing him, and for
good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1

1.

Defendant's Answer is stricken and Default is hereby entered against the

Defendant.
2.

Judgment is hereby entered against the Defendant in the amount of $67,200.00 plus

after accruing judgment rate of interest, costs, and attorneys fees until paid.
3.

The Judgment amount shall be increased be the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees

in the amount of $2,980.00, anlaftiount supported by affidivat as to fees.
DATED THIS r ^ ' d a y ofv_

(

/

•' -\i 1998.
(

' BY THE COURT:

L-

- <v *
Judge Leslie Lewis
District Court Judge
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-

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY RE: MOTION TO SET
ASIDE
Case No: 940905177

vs.
BERT LIETZ,
Defendant.

Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS
Date: 10/27/2000

Clerk: chells
A notice to submit has been filed, pursuant to rule 4-501, code of
Judicial Administration, in connection with the defendant's Motion
to Set Aside Judgemnt and Award of Attorneys Fees. The Court after
having considered the motion and reviewing all the pleadings and
the court's file, the Court denies the motion. The previous
and Award of Fees remains in place.

fudge LESLIE A. LEWIS
s •

/

Page 1
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FILED DISTRICT COURt "
Third Judicial District
NATHAN D. PACE, P.C. (6626)
DAVIDS. PACE (8252)
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET. SUITE 404
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-9700
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

DEC f$2OQ0

..._ _

ByDeputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MYRA MARG1S,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 940905177 CV

v.

BERTLIETZ,
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis
Defendant.
The Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees came before
this Court on the Defendant's second Notice to Submit on October 6,2000. Defendant was
represented by counsel Jerold McPhee, and the Plaintiff was represented by Nathan D. Pace, P>C,
The Court after having considered the motion and reviewing all the pleadings and the Court"s file,
the Court denies the motion. The previous Order and Award of Fees remains in place.

y^n
MADE AND ENTERED this

/ ^> day of

&Mc*^. 2000.

Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Third District Court

W'd

S£:SI

0002-^,0-03(1

r>iU
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BERT LIETZ
4901 SOUTH L A U R A DRIVE
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
(801) 268-1436
feputy C l * f H

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

MYRAMARGIS,
PLAINTIFF,

}
} CASE NUMBER: 940905177CV

V.

}

BERT LIETZ,

} JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS

DEFENDANT.

}

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This matter came before the court on 14 June 1996; her counsel, Nathan Pace
represented the plaintiff, while his attorney, Jerold McPhee, represented the defendant.
The parties reached an accord and satisfaction relating to this matter and agreed to this
action being dismissed. The following facts are provided for the court:
On 14 June 1996 the parties reached an accord and satisfaction, as follows:
"Mr. Lietz will return to Myra Margis all bingo equipment
taken from the Carousel Club, as well as any other
personal property of any - - either Mrs. Margis or any of
the people who were there, the patrons of the carousel.
Mr. Lietz will make no claim on the automobiles that
secure Mr. Margis' debt to him. Both parties sign the
mutual release of all claims against the either party and
there will be the mutual restraining order in effect between
the parties."
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The court questioned the parties relating to the above accord and satisfaction, both
parties acknowledged their acceptance.

The court then accepted the accord and

satisfaction and order Mr. Pace to prepare the paperwork for dismissal. A copy of the
transcript is incorporated and marked Exhibit "A." Also provided is a copy of the money
order, which is incorporated and marked as Exhibit "B." A statement relating to the
return of the property was previously filed with the court.
Therefore, the defendant has complied with the accord and has satisfied the matter
and the matter was thusly dismissed.
Plaintiffs attorney was ordered during this hearing to prepare and submit the
necessary paperwork to dismiss this action, he failed to. This was a willful and deliberate
violation on Mr. Pace's part, because the court clearly ordered him to do it and the rules
of judicial Administration, Rule 4-504 requires it. His failure is a clear contempt of the
court's order and will be made an issue separately on an order to show cause. The
following is the courts own words:
I will allow you, then, Mr. Pace, to prepare the documents
concerning dismissal.
Mr. Pace the acknowledge the courts order by stating, "That's fine."
The defendant has taken it upon himself to prepare the paperwork and is
submitting it for signature.
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Page 3
Order of Dismissal
Civil Number: 940905177CV
Plaintiff: Myra Margis
Defendant: Bert Lietz

Therefore, the court after reviewing the defendant's dismissal and a full review of
transcript and other documents provided, and the court record and upon good cause
appearing the court orders the following:
It is hereby adjudged, decreed, and ordered that:
1. The parties did reach an accord and satisfaction in this matter. Furthermore,
the court, in open court and on the record, accepted the accord and satisfaction as
represented and accepted by both parties.
2. Once the court accepted the settlement agreement the court ordered the case to
be dismissed and order the plaintiffs attorney to prepare the documents for its dismissal
Clearly from the record the plaintiffs attorney failed to comply with this courts order.
3. The effective date of dismissal is 14 June 1996.
Therefore, this action is dismissed with prejudice effective 14 June 1996.
Dated this //

day of March 2001
"OF THE COURT:

Third Judicial District Court Judge
Leslie A. Lewis
, A,

S *

J

^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MYRA MARGIS,
Plaintiff,

vs.

•
•

COURT'S RULING

•
•

CASE NO. 940905177

:

BERT LIETZ,

:

Defendant.

:

The Court has before it several Notices to Submit, filed
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
in

connection

with

defendant's

Motion

to

Strike

Plaintiff's

Pleading from 10 October 2000 through Present, defendant's Motion
to Quash and Recall Garnishment and Motion to Enlarge Time and the
plaintiff's Motion to Strike Order.

The Court has carefully

considered each of these Motions and has also thoroughly reviewed
the file in this matter.
It appears that this matter came before the Court for a pretrial conference on June 14, 1996.

According to the Minutes for

this conference, the parties indicated to the Court that they had
reached a stipulation.

The stipulation was read into the record

and the trial date was stricken.

Counsel for the plaintiff was

instructed to prepare the Order dismissing the case based on the
stipulation.
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In response to a letter written to the Court by the plaintiff,
dated November 3, 1997, the Court scheduled a hearing for April 30,
1998.

For unclear reasons, it does not appear that this hearing

was ever held.

Instead, because an Order of dismissal was never

prepared, the Court scheduled a pretrial/scheduling conference for
August 14, 1998.

The Minutes for the August 14, 1998, hearing,

indicate that the defendant and his counsel, Mr. McPhie, failed to
appear.

The Court granted the plaintiff attorney's fees and

travel costs, totaling $980.

The hearing was then re-scheduled

for August 21, 1998, with a warning from the Court that if Mr.
McPhie or one of his associates

failed to appear again, the

defendant's pleading would be stricken and judgment entered against
him.
On August 21, 1998, Mr. McPhie again failed to appear and the
Court granted the plaintiff's request to strike the defendant's
Answer and enter judgment

in her favor.

The judgment amount

granted was $67,200, together with interest to accrue from the date
of the hearing.

Attorney's fees were also granted.

The Order and

Judgment was entered on August 28, 1998.
On September 2, 1998, the defendant filed a Motion to Set
Aside Judgment and Attorney's Fees.

The basis for this Motion was

that Mr. McPhie had been on military duty during the time that the
two hearings were scheduled and was unable to attend.

From the
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COURT'S RULING

point that the defendant filed this Motion to Set Aside, the record
becomes more confusing because the file contains motions filed on
behalf of the defendant by Mr. McPhie, by a Mr. Ziter (who entered
an appearance

of

counsel

defendant himself on a pro

on September
se basis.

28,

1999)

and

by the

It appears that Mr. Ziter

eventually withdrew as defendant's counsel and was replaced by the
defendant's original attorney, Mr. McPhie. However, throughout the
time of his representation by both counsel, the defendant was also
submitting his own motions and pleadings, including a Motion to
Dismiss and the Order of Dismissal, discussed below.
On December 18, 2000, the Court considered the defendant's
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and denied it.

An Order denying the

Motion was entered contemporaneously.
On February 6, 2001, the defendant filed a second Motion and
Memorandum to Set Aside Order and Rule on Outstanding Motions.
This Motion essentially asks the Court to clarify the record by
ruling

on the

defendant's

Motion

to

Strike

(the

plaintiff's

response to the original Motion to Set Aside as untimely), Motion
to Release Funds and defendant's Objection to the plaintiff's
proposed Order.

It should have been clear to the defendant when

the Court entered the plaintiff's proposed Order on December 18,
2000, that the defendant's Motion to Strike, Motion to Release and
Objection were also being denied.

However, to clarify the record,
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the Court now rules that although it was not expressly stated, the
Motion to Strike, Motion to Release and Objection were indeed
denied upon the Court's entry of the December 18, 2000, Order.
On March 12, 2001, the Court received an Order of Dismissal
that was filed by the defendant on a pro

se

basis.

The Court

entered this Order on March 14, 2001, because at first glance it
appeared to reflect the reality that the parties reached an accord
and satisfaction during the June 14, 1996, hearing before the
Court.

However, since the plaintiff filed her Motion to Strike

Order, the Court has had an opportunity to further reflect on the
propriety of this Order and whether it indeed conflicts with the
events that transpired after the June 14, 1996, hearing and

with

the existing Judgment and Order already entered by the Court on
August 28, 1998.

The Court now determines that the Order of

Dismissal does conflict with the prior Judgment and Order.

In

addition, it is not clear to the Court that the parties ever
reached

an

accord

and

satisfaction

because

a

formal

Order

dismissing the case based on the June 14, 1996, stipulation was
never prepared and entered.

Accordingly, the Court grants the

plaintiff's Motion to Strike and vacates the Order of Dismissal
entered on March 14. 2001. Furthermore, the defendant's Motion to

%%
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Quash and Recall Writ of Garnishment, which is based on the nowvacated Order of Dismissal, is also denied.1
Finally, the Court considers the defendant's Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Pleadings from 10 October 2000.

While the plaintiff

has apparently mailed certain of her pleadings to an incorrect
address for the defendant, striking the plaintiff's pleadings is
too harsh a remedy, particularly where it does not appear that the
defendant has been prejudiced by this mistake.

Plaintiff is to

ensure that she corrects her mailing address for the defendant for
all future filings.

The defendant's Motion to Strike is denied.

In future if the defendant is represented by counsel, any
motions should be filed by counsel.
This Court's Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court.

•WJ

Dated this

12-day

of August,

i.

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

1 MM

1

v

To clarify the record, in light of the Court's decision to vacate the Order
the defendant's Motion to Quash and related Motion to Enlarge Time are moot. However, in the
interest ofjustice, the Court granted the Motion to Enlarge and considered the defendant's latefiled Reply to the plaintiffs Response to the Defendant's Motion to Quash.

Transcript of June 14, 1996
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Salt

Lake

City,

Utah;

June

14,

1996;

P.M.

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

We're on the record in the

matter of Myra Margis -- did I mispronounce
MR. PACE:

it?

No.

THE COURT:

-- versus Bert Lietz.

I'll

indicate it's case number 940905177.
Mr. Pace is here with the plaintiff, the
defendant

is also present with counsel Mr. McPhee,

and this matter was set for pre-trial.
visited

Counsel has

respectively with the Court and their client

and it's my understanding

--

And I will ask you to reflect this for the
record, as plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Pace, that there
has been a resolution.
MR. PACE:
THE COURT:

Is that

correct?

That is correct.
Will you state, for the record,

what your understanding of the resolution is.
MR. PACE:

Mr. Lietz will return to Myra

Margis all the bingo equipment taken from the
Carousel Club, as well as any other personal

property

of any -- either Mrs. Margis or any of the people who
were there, the patrons of the Carousel.

Mr. Lietz

will pay to Mrs. Margis the sum of $750.

Mr. Lietz

will make no claim on the automobiles that

secure

4
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Mrs. Margis' debt to him. Both parties will sign the
mutual release of all claims against either party,
and there will be the mutual restraining order in
effect between the parties.

Both parties shall have

no contact, harassings, or any contact with the other
party except through their legal counsel.

And I

believe that's it.
MR. MCPHEE:

In addition -- one additional

and one correction.
With respect to personal property that
Mr. Lietz has or may have in his possession, if
Mr. Lietz has personal property in his possession he
will return that or make it available, any of the
personal property he has, other than the bingo
equipment, bingo machines, flash boards, microphones,
and miscellaneous supplies.
Moreover, your Honor, payment and
delivery -- rather, delivery of the equipment at a
time convenient to plaintiff, and certainly within 14
days, and payment of the $750 within like period of
t ime .
THE COURT:
to have a concern.

Mr. Pace, your client

appears

Is there anything else that needs

to be clarified?
MR. PACE:

Yeah.

There were a number of

5
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patrons of the Carousel Club that left a personal
amount of personal belonging there, and those
belongings were gone when Mr. Lietz got in back with
the equipment.
THE COURT:
talking

What sorts of items are we

about?
THE PLAINTIFF:

on the table.

People leave personal

There was stuff for sale on

consignment that belongs to other people.
for something

items

I'm

asking

-- jackets, bingo bags full of bumpers

and trinkets that they use for the bingo game, and
also\the kitchen equipment and -THE COURT:

All right.

So, to the extent

that those items exist, they are to be returned
within the 14-day period of time.

To the extent that

they are not provided, I think the plaintiff

is

clearly entitled to an explanation, through counsel,
of what occurred to those items.

And I don't know

that we can do better than that.

If they're

in

existence and in the defendant's possession they are
to be restored.
You're going to have your hands

full,

Mr. Lietz, not from Mrs. Margis, but from the other
individuals, if they're not returned.
being -- don't, please don't point.

These

items

6
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What I would ask is that you give some
thought to this matter and, as Mr. McPhee pointed
out, you have a restoration period of 14 days, and
what is required is you are to turn over everything
that is encompassed in the agreement.
All right. Does that satisfy your client's
concerns, Mr. Pace?
MR. PACE:

I believe so.

MR. MCPHEE:

Your Honor, if I may indicate,

Mr. Lietz handed me a receipt, indemnity

agreement

executed by a Millie Hunt, stating that she had
asserted a claim and is taking possession of two
cupcake pans, two big pots, and one cookie sheet that
would be -- I assume that is one of the

individuals

who assert a claim against personal items that
Mr. Lietz may have had.
THE COURT:

To the extent that items have

been restored, obviously, Mrs. Margis is not going to
contend that they haven't been restored.

I

understand that she's attempting to make sure people
who have claims to property that would have been on
the premises, have that restored to them.

Obviously,

if somebody has gotten back their items, then, that's
something that she is not going to pursue, or the
others are not going to pursue.
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Now, Mrs. Margis, is this your
understanding of the agreement?
bound by it?

Do you agree to be

And I am referring to everything

Mr. Pace has said with the modification suggested by
Mr. McPhee.
THE PLAINTIFF: I'm not getting back the
stuff he took, I guess, but -THE COURT:

I have no way of knowing that,

but you have excellent representation and what you
need to do is decide whether or not you want to go to
trial on this and pay attorney's fees, and see what
happens at the end of the trial, or whether you want
to accept it.

No one is forcing you to accept it.

It's up to you, but if you accept it you will be
bound by it.

And I suspect that if you don't

accept

it, this $750 and restoration of property will not be
on the table the next time.

So that's up to you.

you need time to think about it?

Do

Or is this your

agreement and do you agree to be bound by it?
THE PLAINTIFF: I guess I'm willing to try.
THE COURT:

Is this your

THE PLAINTIFF:
THE COURT:

agreement?

Yes.

And do you agree to be bound by

it?
THE PLAINTIFF:

Yes.
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Mr. Lietz, is this your

agreement and do you agree to be bound by it?
THE DEFENDANT: I do.
THE COURT:

I'm

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

sorry?
I do.

I will allow you, then,

Mr. Pace, to prepare the documents

concerning

dismissal .
MR. PACE:
THE COURT:

That's fine.
Thank you to both of you.

MR. MCPHEE:

If I may, again, with benefit

of the record, I will be out of town between the 16th
and 28th.

This will be due on the 28th.

I have no

problem with Mr. Pace contacting Mr. Lietz directly
or Mr. Lietz contacting Mr. Pace directly to arrange
for payment and delivery.
THE COURT:

Now, a clear understanding,

Mr. Lietz, that you may contact Mr. Pace pursuant to
what Mr. McPhee has represented, but you are not,
under any circumstances, to contact the plaintiff
directly.

All right?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Is there anything further at

this time?
MR. PACE:

Yes.

No
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you.
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That takes care of it.

Thank

The best of luck everybody.
(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT:

Let me indicate for the record

that Mr. McPhee has represented he has no problem
with Mr. Pace tendering the order without
Mr. McPhee's written approval as to form and content.
And I know Mr. Pace to be -- both counsel to be
excellent attorneys with high ethical standard, and
so we will rely on that representation and Mr. Pace's
professionalism in that regard.
MR. PACE:

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MCPHEE:

Thank you, your Honor.

May we

be excused?
THE COURT:

Yes.

Good to see all of you.

(Proceedings in the
above - entitled matter were
concluded.)

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-501
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This
rule does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of
extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda.
All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities
appropriate affidavits, and copies oi or citations by page
number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in
length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the
court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is
made to file an over-length memorandum, the application
shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the
memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall
include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five
pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion.
The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. If
the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition
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to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the
court for decision as provided in paragraph (1)(D) of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum.
The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum
within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision.
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply
memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice
to Submit for Decision." The Notice to Submit for Decision
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date
the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a
hearing has been requested. The notification shall contain a
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(A) Memorandum m support of a motion.
The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those
portions of the record upon which the movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion.
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a
verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists
followed by a concise statement of material facts which
support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically
refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing
party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemea admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a
hearing unless ordered by the court, or requested by the
parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of
the action or any claim in the action on the merits with
prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may
file a written request for a hearing.
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(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that
(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b)
that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively
decided.
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall
notify the requesting party. When a request for hearing is
granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the
requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and
notify all parties of the date and time.
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy
of the motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all
documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be
delivered to the judge hearmg the matter at least two working
days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of
the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk
of the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the
parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the
motion shall be deemed waived.
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30)
days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions
shall be heard after that date without leave of the court.
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party
fails to file a memorandum in opposition, the moving party
may withdraw the request or the court on its own motion may
strike the request and decide the motion without oral
argument.
(4) Expedited dispositions.
Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court
may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the
motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be
resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference.
The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct
arguments of any motion by telephone conference witnout
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by
counsel.
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments,
and decrees to the court. This rule is not intended to change existing law
with respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.
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Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in courts of record except small
claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in
conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature
unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to
the court and counsel within five days after service.
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen days of the settlement
and dismissal.
(4) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner as
to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the
attorneys of record in uie cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order
or decree is made.
(5) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall
contain, if known, the judgment debtor's address or last known address and
social security number.
(6) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of
the documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is
based.
(7) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation
was made on the record.
(8) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach to the new
complaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written
obligation.
(9) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the power of any court,
upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement agreement or any other
agreement which has not been reduced to writing.
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6
(a) Computation.
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the
local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period
so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which
is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided
under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays
and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement.
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court
an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without
motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a
previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent
and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term.
The period of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any
proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued existence or
expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a
term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act or take
any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits.
A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice
of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time
5

specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules, by
CJA 4-501, or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be
made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the
affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before
the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail.
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days
shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under
subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in
the computation of any 3-day period under this subsection, except that if the
last day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the
period shall run until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday,
Sunday, or a legal holiday.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55
(a) Default.
(1) Entry.
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact
is made to appear the clerk shall enter his default.
(2) Notice to party in default.
After the entry of the default of any party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1)
of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice
of action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice or paper otherwise
required by these rules to be served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is
necessary for the court to conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party.
(b) Judgment.
Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk.
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When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain, and the defendant has been
personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal service
outside of this state, the clerk upon request of the plaintiff shall enter
judgment for the amount due and costs against the defendant, if he has been
defaulted for failure to appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent
person.
(2) By the court.
In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to
carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or
to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such
hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default.
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants.
The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment
by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a
cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to
the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof.
No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against
an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60
(a) Clerical mistakes.
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal,
such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
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(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence
of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed in Section 7832-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view
and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a
statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial officers.
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